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Abstract
We build a heterogeneous life-cycle model which captures a large number of salient fea-
tures of individual labor supply, by education, over the life cycle. The model provides
an aggregation theory of individual labor supply, rmly grounded on micro evidence,
and is used to study the aggregate labor supply responses to changes in the economic
environment. We nd that the aggregate labor supply elasticity to a transitory wage
shock is 1.27, with the extensive margin accounting for 54% of the response. Further-
more, we also simulate the 1987 tax holiday in Iceland   a quasi-natural experiment
  and nd that the aggregate labor supply responses in the model are similar to those
actually observed in Iceland.
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11 Introduction
How responsive is aggregate labor supply to changes in the economic environment? The an-
swer to this question has wide-ranging implications for understanding the eects of numerous
phenomena such as business cycles and various government policies.1 Aggregate labor supply
is ultimately the sum of all individuals' labor supply decisions. The empirical evidence indi-
cates that aggregate labor supply responses are determined by individual responses along both
the intensive and the extensive margins.2 Further, economic theory implies that labor supply
responses along the intensive and extensive margins are distinct objects. The intensive margin
responses are mainly driven by the intertemporal substitution of labor (the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply). The extensive margin responses, on the other hand, are determined by the
distribution of reservation wages and the mass of agents who are close to being indierent
between working or not. Chang and Kim (2006) build on the insights from the model of
indivisible labor in Rogerson (1988), introduce heterogeneity, and show that the slope of the
aggregate labor supply schedule is determined by the distribution of reservation wages rather
than by the willingness to substitute leisure intertemporally, establishing that when the ex-
tensive margin is operative heterogeneity and aggregation play a crucial role in determining
aggregate labor supply responses.
Individuals dier along a large number of dimensions and, depending on their charac-
teristics, will respond dierently to aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks, such as a change in
taxes or a labor productivity shock   the young would respond dierently from the old, the
non-college from the college, those with a small amount of assets from those with a large
amount of assets. Therefore, in order to have a theory of aggregate labor supply behavior,
which can then be used with some condence in analyzing the eects of various government
policies and macroeconomic shocks, the starting point needs to be a quantitative theory which
is rich in heterogeneity and is consistent with individuals' labor supply behavior along many
dimensions. Only then, having been disciplined with micro-level facts, can the model become
a useful tool for explicitly aggregating individuals' decisions into an aggregate labor supply
response. This is the goal of this paper.
We proceed with our analysis as follows. We start by presenting a rich set of facts about
the labor supply decisions of male workers in the US, by education, over their life cycle using
data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) as well as the Survey of Income and
1See Keane (2010) and Keane and Rogerson (2011) for a recent survey of the literature.
2See Cooley, ed (1995) for evidence on the adjustment in labor supply along both margins over the business
cycle and Blundell et al. (2011) for recent evidence on the importance of both margins over time in the US,
the UK, and France.
2Program Participation (SIPP).3 Next, we develop a neo-classical model of the labor market
with heterogeneous agents who make labor supply decisions both along the extensive margin
(whether to work or not) and the intensive margin (how much to work). The key feature of
our theory for delivering periods of non-participation is the nonlinear mapping between hours
of work and earnings, which is convex at low hours of work. This mapping is obtained as the
competitive equilibrium outcome of an economy with a production technology in which hours
of work and number of workers are imperfect substitutes; e.g., see Hornstein and Prescott
(1993) and Osuna and R os-Rull (2003). The nonlinearity in earnings is disciplined with the
evidence in Aaronson and French (2004) who use the exogenous variation in the US social
security rules and nd that a 50% decline in hours worked decreases hourly wages by 20%.
We obtain heterogeneity in the model by introducing life cycle, education, and incomplete
markets. The theory models life-cycle behavior in order to relate better the model predictions
to the data   the various labor supply facts presented in the empirical section exhibit strong
life-cycle patterns. Furthermore, as will become evident from our analysis, the labor supply
responses of heterogeneous agents, especially along the extensive margin, interact in an im-
portant way with the incomplete markets at various stages over the life cycle. Chang and
Kim (2006), Domeij and Flod en (2006), and Pijoan-Mas (2006) study labor supply decisions
in a framework with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets but, dierently from our
paper, they do not model life-cycle behavior. The model in French (2005) which features a
life cycle, incomplete markets, and nonlinear earnings is the closest to our framework. How-
ever, we address very dierent issues   while French (2005) focuses mainly on retirement
behavior, we study the labor supply responses to transitory and permanent shocks over the
whole life cycle and model the extensive margin at a 4 month rather than annual period.4
Relative to Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), who build a life-cycle (complete markets) model
with an operative extensive margin, our contribution is to build a rich in heterogeneity theory
of aggregation which is disciplined with micro data. We will show that the aggregate response
to temporary unexpected shocks in our incomplete markets economy is signicantly lower
3We have also documented similar facts for females, but in this paper we focus only on the aggregate
labor supply of males. While it would also be important to model female labor supply, this is left for future
research. First, there are dramatic changes in labor supply across dierent cohorts of women, and modeling
them will require a non-stationary environment and taking a stand on the causes for these changes. Second,
even in a stationary environment, it is a daunting computational task to model a two-earner household in an
incomplete-markets model with a sub-annual period. Nevertheless, we conjecture that the insights from our
current analysis of male labor supply would be also valuable for understanding aggregate female labor supply
responses.
4Low (2005) studies individual labor supply in a life-cycle model with incomplete markets, but, dierently
from our approach, his model does not feature a 4-month model period, nonlinear earnings and an active
extensive margin, and does not study aggregate labor supply responses.
3than in the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) economy and is consistent with evidence from the
quasi-natural experiment provided by the 1987 tax holiday in Iceland (see below for further
discussion).
The calibration of the model economy involves three key tasks. First, we pin down the
parameter determining how hours of work aect labor productivity in the model economy
using estimates from Aaronson and French (2004). In a second step, the age prole and shock
process on labor productivity are estimated following an indirect inference approach that
explicitly controls for the selection problems that make the calibration of these parameters
dicult. The third task is to take a stand on measurement error in hours in the PSID data.
We propose a novel approach to estimate measurement error that consists in comparing both
in the model and in the data the variance of transitory wages in two alternative specications
of the wage process. The rst specication estimates the process for observed wages while
the second specication estimates the process for wages net of the eect of hours of work on
wages. Identication comes from the fact that measurement error in hours has a dierent
eect on the variance of transitory wages in the two specications of the estimation.
We calibrate alternative economies that dier in the preference parameter  determining
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure (i.e.s.) given by 1=. We nd that
when the i.e.s. varies in the tight range of 0.45 to 0.55 ( between 1.8 and 2.2) the model
captures well the life-cycle patterns in hours worked for college and non-college individuals in
the US, even though these patters were not explicitly targeted by the calibration. The baseline
economy ( equal to 2) accounts for the low co-movement of hours and wages early in the
life cycle, when wages are rising rapidly but hours are relatively at. Incomplete markets are
crucial for this result. While individuals face an increasing age prole of wages, they work
long hours when young because they need to build a buer stock of savings to self-insure
against income risk. By age 50 their stock of assets is suciently large that individuals can
aord to take a quadrimester o work when they receive a low realization of the temporary
wage shock. This accounts for the pronounced decline in annual working hours late in the
life cycle. The model is also consistent with most of the salient features about labor supply
in the data such as heterogeneity in labor supply, persistence in annual hours, and covariance
and correlation of changes in hours and wages. We nd that measurement error in hours is
quantitatively important and varies with the education and age of individuals (over the life
cycle the variance of measurement error in log hours is on average slightly less than 0.03 for
non-college individuals and about 0.02 for college individuals).
Given that the theory accounts well for the micro facts, we use the model economy to
4study aggregate labor supply responses. We nd that a one period wage change in the baseline
economy implies an aggregate labor supply (Frisch) elasticity of 1.27, which is more than twice
as big as the Frisch (theoretical) elasticity embedded in the calibration of the model economy
(0.61). The large labor supply response along the extensive margin explains why the Frisch
elasticity is much bigger than the theoretical elasticity. Restricting attention to labor supply
changes only along the intensive margin decreases the Frisch elasticity from 1.27 to 0.58.
Hence, the extensive margin accounts for about 54% of the aggregate labor supply response
to a temporary wage change. This nding is consistent with the evidence provided in Kimmel
and Kniesner (1998) who estimate in SIPP data an elasticity of labor supply of 1.25, with
the extensive margin accounting for 70% of the total elasticity. To evaluate the compensated
elasticity to a permanent wage change, we simulate an increase in the labor income tax. Tax
proceeds are assumed to be rebated with a lump sum transfer to working-age individuals. We
nd that the elasticities for both the intensive and extensive margins are reduced by a half
relative to the case of a temporary wage change. Now the labor supply elasticity is 0.65 and
the employment elasticity is 0.35, which should be compared to the elasticities of 1.27 and
0.69 to a temporary wage change. Hence, not surprisingly, individuals respond more strongly
to a temporary wage change than to a permanent compensated-wage change.
To put our ndings in perspective, we nd it convenient to conclude the discussion by
answering the following three questions. First, are the aggregate labor supply responses in
our calibrated model economy consistent with the quasi-experimental evidence surveyed in
Chetty et al. (2011)? The mean value of the Hicks elasticity of aggregate hours across the micro
studies reviewed in Chetty et al. (2011) is 0.76, with substantial variation in the estimated
elasticities across studies.5 Consistently with this evidence, our baseline economy predicts a
Hicks elasticity of aggregate hours of work of 0.65. In order to evaluate the predictions of
our theory of labor supply, we simulate the tax holiday that took place in Iceland in 1987.
The Icelandic tax holiday is ideally suited for identifying intertemporal labor supply responses
because it induced an unanticipated temporary wage variation during the year 1987. In 1987,
Iceland moved from a system under which taxes were paid on the previous year's income to
a pay-as-you-earn system. The transition to the new tax system implied that income during
1987 was never taxed since the tax base in 1987 was income earned in 1986 and the tax base
in 1988 was income earned in 1988. The average tax rate was 14.5% in 1986, 0% in 1987,
and 8.0% in 1988. We simulate in our baseline economy a one year (three model periods)
5Since there are wide condence intervals associated with each of the point estimates as well as method-
ological disputes about the validity of some of the studies, Chetty et al. (2011) argue that the estimates should
be treated as rough values meant to gauge the order of magnitudes.
5reduction in the tax rate of 14.5 percentage points that is followed by a permanent decrease
of 6.5 percentage points in the average tax rate (relative to the initial tax rate of 27% in
the baseline economy). We nd that the aggregate elasticity of labor supply implied by the
Icelandic tax holiday experiment is 0.68, with extensive and intensive margin elasticities of
0.33 and 0.35, respectively. Remarkably, these elasticity results are not far from the ones
estimated by Bianchi et al. (2001) in the Icelandic micro data: for male workers, they nd an
employment elasticity of 0.58 and an intensive margin elasticity of 0.26. Our theory is also
consistent with the evidence on the intertemporal substitution elasticities in labor supply late
in the life cycle documented in the cross-country studies in Gruber and Wise, eds (1999). In
Erosa et al. (2012) we extend our baseline economy to model in detail the variation in the
social security, disability insurance, and taxation institutions across European countries and
the United States. We nd that the extended baseline model economy accounts well for the
observed cross-country dierences in labor supply late in the life cycle, indicating that the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply in our model economy is plausible.
Second, does heterogeneity play an important role in our results? This question can be
answered by comparing the aggregate labor supply responses in our model to those in Rogerson
and Wallenius (2009) (RW), who evaluate a life-cycle model with nonlinear earnings and
complete markets. While labor supply responses to permanent tax changes are similar across
both models, the RW model predicts much higher responses to temporary tax changes. Chetty
et al. (2011) simulate the Icelandic tax experiment on the RW model and nd that it implies
an implausibly high change in employment. On the other hand, our model's predictions for the
labor supply responses are consistent with the evidence from the Icelandic tax holiday. Our
baseline economy with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets has a smaller fraction
of agents that are close to being indierent between working or staying out of the labor force
than in the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) representative agent model.6 We thus conclude
that heterogeneity is key for understanding aggregate labor supply responses to temporary
shocks (Frisch elasticity) but not to permanent tax changes (Hicks elasticity).
Third, is the modeling of nonlinear earnings important for our ndings? By modeling
nonlinear earnings labor supply also responds along the extensive margin, and the aggre-
gate elasticity becomes substantially larger than the theoretical elasticity embedded in the
calibration of the preference parameters. In fact, when we simulate a version of our model
6In the language of Ljungqvist and Sargent (2011), and relative to the RW model, our economy with
heterogeneity within cohorts has more individuals that are at a corner in their labor supply decisions at the
participation margin (i.e., far from being indierent between working or not). In addition, young individuals,
who are building precautionary savings, are less responsive at the intensive margin to temporary shocks.
6economy with linear wages the aggregate labor supply response is close to the one implied
by the theoretical Frisch elasticity. Hence, the extensive margin is an important factor for
generating large aggregate labor supply responses. It is important to emphasize this point
since several recent papers on labor supply imply a smaller aggregate Frisch elasticity than
the Frisch elasticity embedded in the individuals' preferences.7
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents empirical facts on labor supply
using data from the PSID and the SIPP. Section 3 develops a life-cycle theory of individual
labor supply with heterogeneous agents. The calibration of the model economy is discussed
in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the performance of the baseline economy in accounting for
the documented facts on labor supply. Section 6 studies aggregate labor supply responses




We use the Michigan Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) for the period 1968-1997 in
order to compute all annual statistics.8 The sample is restricted to males between the ages of
18 and 65. We do not place other restrictions on the sample. In particular, note that we do
not restrict to heads of households   we use the information on annual hours worked provided
by the PSID for those males who are listed as \wives" as well as the information on annual
hours worked, whenever available in the individual les, on males who are dependents. This
allows us to provide a more representative overview of the facts on labor supply as compared
to the related literature which has mainly focused on male workers with strong labor market
7Imai and Keane (2004) emphasize the importance of human capital accumulation while Domeij and Flod en
(2006) and Pijoan-Mas (2006) study the eect of borrowing constraints on understanding the individual
labor supply responses. While Imai and Keane (2004) estimate a large Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the
aggregate labor supply response to a temporary wage shock is four times smaller. Intuitively, when the
returns to human capital are an important part of the return to work, temporary wage shocks have a smaller
eect on the incentives to work, and labor supply responses are small. Similarly, but through a dierent
economic mechanism, the labor supply response of liquidity constrained individuals will be smaller, or even
of the opposite sign, than what is predicted by an analysis that ignores such constraints, as emphasized by
Domeij and Flod en (2006) and Pijoan-Mas (2006). Note, again, that this reasoning also implies that labor
supply should not be very responsive to aggregate temporary wage shocks   a result which we conrm in an
experiment in which we simulate a linear earnings version of our benchmark economy.
8We have performed a similar empirical analysis using the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP). The annual statistics obtained on the SIPP data are largely consistent with those obtained on the
PSID data. These are available from the authors upon request.
7attachment.9
The analysis is focused on the labor supply of men. A cohort is dened to consist of all
individuals who turn 18 years old in a given year   for example, the 1967 cohort consists of
all individuals who turn 18 years old in 1967. Since the PSID is a relatively small dataset, we
grouped our sample into age and cohort groups. By age, individuals are grouped into 12 age
groups each consisting of four ages   for example, the age-18 group on the graphs includes
individuals between the age of 18 and 21, while the age-22 group includes all individuals
between the ages of 22 and 25. We have 17 cohort groups each consisting of three cohorts
  for instance, the 1976 cohort group includes cohorts 1976, 1977, and 1978 while the 1985
cohort includes cohorts 1985, 1986, and 1987. We drop all cohorts smaller than 1940 and all
cohorts greater than 1990.10 We use PSID sample weights in the analysis.
Next we proceed with the empirical analysis and document a rich set of facts regarding the
labor supply of men over the life cycle. The patterns that we see in the data will be motivating
the main features which will be introduced in the model. The most important patterns are
as follows: i) we see a very pronounced life-cycle pattern in the labor supply behavior of men.
We see a life-cycle trend in the mean annual hours worked, the participation rate, and the
dispersion of annual hours; ii) there is a substantial dispersion of annual hours worked at
every point in the life cycle; iii) for most individuals, and for most ages during the life cycle,
annual hours are quite persistent; and iv) the labor supply behavior of high school and college
graduates is dierent enough to warrant a separate analysis for each of these groups.11
2.2 Facts on the life-cycle labor supply of men
2.2.1 Average annual hours over the life cycle
Figure 1 shows that mean annual hours worked clearly exhibit an inverted U-shape over the
life cycle   they increase early in life until the late 20s, stay constant after that until the late
40s, and decline monotonically after the age of 50. The second panel shows that college and
non-college graduates have dierent life-cycle proles   college graduates initially work less
(while studying) while working more after the age of 26. In addition, the mean annual hours
of high-school workers start declining earlier, at the age of 50.
9See for example Storesletten et al. (2001), Heathcote et al. (2010), Kaplan (2011).
10When we conduct the analysis by education groups, our last cohort is 1985 in order to be able to classify
individuals as either high school or college.
11We consider an individual to be high school if he or she has at most 12 years of education while those
with 14 years of education or more are considered to be college graduates. A sensitivity analysis with respect
to the education cut-o separating high-school and college graduates indicates that the current partition is a
sensible one.
8Figures A-1 and A-2 illustrate the intensive and extensive margins at the annual level of
labor supply of men over the life cycle. Between ages 30 to 46 working hours are quite constant
and average annual hours are about 2,200 for non-college and 2,300 for college graduates. The
extensive margin at the annual level matters early in life until the age of 26, but is especially
quantitatively important late in life after the age of 50. Furthermore, it is interesting to point
out that the participation rate of those with high-school starts declining in the late 40s while
the participation rate of those with college start declining signicantly only in the late 50s.
2.2.2 Dispersion of annual hours over the life cycle
Figure 2 displays the dispersion of annual hours over the life cycle as measured by the coe-
cient of variation of annual hours. This gure illustrates three facts of particular importance.
First, the dispersion in annual hours is U-shaped   it is high early in the life cycle until the
age of 26, then declines and is constant until the late 40s, and increases substantially after the
age of 50. Second, the degree of dispersion is quite substantial as the coecient of variation is
between 0.30 and 0.40 during the life cycle, except close to retirement when it increases above
1. Third, even though the dispersion of hours over the life cycle has the same shape for both
groups of college and non-college individuals, the coecient of variation in hours is higher for
the non-college group for all ages after 22.
2.2.3 Persistence in annual hours worked
In this section, we investigate the extent to which annual hours worked are persistent over
the individual's life. For that purpose each year we divide individuals into four groups: 1  
those with annual hours less than 100; 2   those with annual hours between 100 and 1500; 3
  those with annual hours between 1500 and 2800; and 4   those with annual hours greater
than 2800.12 We then construct transition matrices where cell ij indicates the fraction of all
individuals in cell i in year t who moved to cell j in year t+1. We document the facts for all
men, as well as for high school graduates and college graduates.
Table A-3 presents the transition matrix and the relative size of each group of men in
three age groups: young workers between the ages of 18 and 29, middle-aged workers between
the ages of 30 and 54, and old workers between the ages of 55 and 65. We found it useful to
present graphically some of these results. In particular, Figure 3 graphs the relative size of
12The cut-os were chosen in order to capture four broad patterns of labor market behavior   no labor
market participation (group 1), part-time labor supply (group 2), full-time labor supply (group 3), and very
high labor supply (group 4). Slight changes in these cut-os do not signicantly change the main patterns
documented here.
9each of the four groups as well as the fraction of workers who stay in each of these groups in
two consecutive years (i.e. the diagonal elements from the transition matrix). Note that this
graphical representation makes it easy to consider 12 age groups rather than the 3 age groups
considered in Table A-3.
Three important ndings are worth pointing out. First, the group of full-time workers with
annual hours between 1500 and 2800 is by far the largest, with the exception of the rst and
very last years of the life cycle, and exhibiting very high persistence in annual hours worked
  over 70% of men are in this labor supply group and more than 80% of those who are in this
group in year t remain in it in year t+1. Table A-3 further shows that, between the ages of 30
and 54, most of those who move out of this group move temporarily into the group with large
labor supply and work more than 2800 hours. That indicates that for the most part of the life
cycle, especially between the ages of 30 and 50, annual hours worked are quite persistent for
most men. Second, the fraction of men who work less than 100 hours is quite small throughout
the life cycle, but starts increasing gradually after the age of 46. Furthermore, with age, this
group becomes an absorbing state   after the age of 46, more than 80% of men who are in
this group in year t will be there in year t + 1. Furthermore, as Table A-3 shows, those who
move out of it later in life, move temporarily into the part-time labor supply group. Third,
the other two groups   those working between 100 and 1500 hours and those working more
than 2800 hours   do exhibit a life-cycle pattern but are relatively small. In addition, each
of these two groups seem to represent a temporary state in one's labor market history since
the probability of remaining there is not very high.
These broad patterns are observed also for each of the two education groups   high-school
and college men (see Tables A-4 and A-5). After the age of 30, the group of full-time workers
with annual hours between 1500 and 2800 (i) is bigger for the college men than the high-
school men, (ii) starts declining earlier for high-school men than college men, and (iii) is more
persistent for college than for high-school men.
2.2.4 Lifetime labor supply
Using the fact that the PSID is a long panel we show that there is no association between
lifetime labor supply and average labor productivity (wages) over the life cycle across individ-
uals of the same education group. To this end, for each cohort and education group we divide
individuals into high and low productivity types. First, we compute each individual's mean
wage over the age of 30 to 45 and classify them into high and low types depending on whether
their mean wages are above or below the median wage in their cohort-education category. We
10then compute mean hours worked for high and low types and nd that there are virtually no
dierences in labor supply.13
The dispersion in lifetime labor supply is another useful statistic which is closely related
to the persistence in an individual's labor supply over time. Due to the nature of the PSID
dataset, we do not observe individuals throughout all their life   some of them have already
been in the labor market for some time when the survey starts in 1968 while those who enter
the labor market in 1968 at the age of 18 are only in their 40s in 1997. Nevertheless, we can
learn a lot even if we follow individuals for shorter periods. We choose to follow individuals for
periods of 10 years at dierent stages in their life-cycle: ages 26-35, 36-45, 46-55, and 56-64.
We drop all individuals who have a missing observation during the relevant ten years and
sum the hours worked for each individual during the whole ten years. Then we compute the
dispersion in this cumulative measure of hours worked. Considering two extreme examples
is useful for illustrating how to interpret the results. Consider a particular group, e.g. the
group between the ages of 36 and 45, and suppose that all individuals work the same number
of hours throughout the whole period as at the beginning at the age of 36. In that case, the
coecient of variation of the cumulative hours worked throughout the whole period would be
the same as the coecient of variation (cross-sectionally) at the age of 36 (or any other age
in the period). Alternative, suppose that individual hours uctuate a lot over the period and
those who work a lot in one year work very little the year after that. In that case, workers
would end up working quite similar cumulative hours over the period, and the coecient of
variation of the cumulative hours worked throughout the whole period would be quite small
and substantially lower than the coecient of variation (cross-sectionally) at the age of 36 (or
any other age in the period).
Table 1 reports the coecient of variation of the cumulative hours worked for the four
age groups dened above. The results indicate that hours are quite persistent, especially
over the ages of 26 and 55. This analysis provides us with two important ndings. First,
the dispersion in cumulative hours is quite substantial, indicating that individuals tend to be
quite persistent in their labor supply behavior. This is consistent with the mobility matrices
discussed in section 2.2.3. Second, the dispersion of cumulative hours is smaller than the cross-
sectional dispersion at any age in the 26-64 interval. This implies that workers do sometimes
change their hours worked. This is also consistent with the mobility matrices discussed in
section 2.2.3 since   as seen in the middle panel of Table A-3 for those between the ages of
13Focusing on the age group 30-45 and non-college individuals, the average hours worked across all cohorts
is 2143 for type 1 individuals and 2166 for the type 2. For individuals with college education, average hours
are 2269 and 2271 for type 1 and type 2, respectively.
1130 and 54   the diagonal elements of the mobility matrices are not zero, and we do observe
workers who switch across the hours categories.
2.3 The Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP)
We also use data from the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP). The SIPP
interviews individuals three times a year (rather than once a year as in the PSID) and allows us
to compute other labor market statistics of interest at a lower frequency, such as a quadrimester
(a 4-month period). We use the 1990 SIPP Panel. Figure A-3 shows the distribution of hours
within a quadrimester, for six age-education groups. The distribution of quadrimesterly hours
is bimodal, with a peak at zero hours and another one at 600 hours. Further, there are
virtually no individuals working between zero and 500 hours in a quadrimester. Figure A-4
graphs the fraction of individuals working three quadrimesters in a year. There is a sizable
fraction of individuals that do not work all year round   more than 20% of the non-college
and more than 10% of the college.
3 The Model
We develop a life-cycle theory of the labor supply of individuals. The model abstracts from the
labor supply decisions of women and analyzes only males. We consider a small open economy
facing a xed interest rate and follow Hornstein and Prescott (1993) in modeling a production
technology that gives rise to a competitive equilibrium with nonlinear earnings. The model
economy is closely related to French (2005).
3.1 Population, preferences, and endowments
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals who start their lives at
age 25, face uncertain lifetimes, and live, at most, J periods. They dier in terms of their
education (college versus non-college) and labor productivity. The date-t utility function takes
the form






where ct is consumption and lt denotes leisure. The utility function is consistent with balanced
growth   this assumption allows the theory to be consistent with the fact, discussed in section
2.2.4, that there are large permanent dierences in labor productivities across individuals
(heterogeneity in xed eects) but not in their lifetime labor supply. Note that by modeling
the utility of leisure (rather than the disutility of labor), the theory allows for an active
12extensive margin. In particular, the specication u(ct;ht) = lnct   '
h1 
t
1  does not deliver an
active extensive margin, and, moreover, it often implies that individuals work 100% of their
available time.






where Et denotes expectations at date-t: Individuals face mortality shocks each period and
uncertainty regarding their labor productivity z up to age 65 when labor productivity is zero
(mandatory retirement). An individual's time endowment in each period is one. The amount
of time that can be allocated to work is hj = 1   lj. The college decision is exogenous, and
the education type of an individual determines the stochastic processes driving the mortality
and labor productivity shocks.
3.2 Technology
There are a large number of plants, and each plant is a collection of jobs. We assume that




; with   "  1 (3)
where h denotes the workweek, K is the amount of capital for the job, and z is eective labor
in the job (which is given by the worker productivity). Note that, for a xed workweek, the
job technology exhibits constant returns to scale in capital and eective labor. Moreover,
as discussed in Osuna and R os-Rull (2003), when " =  the job technology reduces to the
standard Cobb-Douglas technology where total hours of eective labor is what matters. When
" >  the hours and eective labor are imperfect substitutes and the composition between
these two inputs matters. When " = 1 the technology is linear in hours and corresponds
to the case where workers are not subject to fatigue. While the production function of a
job features increasing returns in the three inputs, Hornstein and Prescott (1993) show that
the aggregate technology set is convex. Intuitively, the economy's output doubles when the
productive resources in the economy double (labor force and capital).
3.3 The plant's problem
The plant takes as given the earnings schedule ~ w(h;z) and the interest rate r. For each job,
the plant chooses hours of work h, capital K, and eective labor z. In equilibrium, capital
13is paid its marginal product, and the competition for labor implies that workers will be the
residual claimants on the output which remains after capital has been paid and that prots
will be zero. Moreover, the earnings schedule is a nonlinear function of the workweek h and
a linear function of eective labor z. To show this point, consider a job hiring a worker, with






   K(r + )   ~ w(h;z)g: (4)










Next, notice that a job is open only if prots are non-negative. Free entry, and the fact that
jobs can be opened at zero cost, imply that in equilibrium plants will make zero prots from






(h;r)(r + )   ~ w(h;z) = 0; (6)
which gives
~ w(h;z) = zw(h); where (7)












It follows that the earnings schedule ~ w(h;z) is linear in eective labor z and nonlinear in hours
of work h. When " =  earnings are also linear in h. When " >  earnings increase more
than proportionally with h and, hence, the hourly wage rate also increases with h. In this
case, households would be better o by selling employment lotteries to rms (Hornstein and
Prescott (1993)). However, we rule out this possibility by assuming that households cannot
commit to work when the realization of the employment lottery implies that they should work.











This is the functional form typically estimated in the empirical literature on nonlinear wages
(see the discussion in Aaronson and French (2009)). The theory presented above provides a
theoretical rationale for the functional form used in these empirical studies. Moreover, this is
relevant since our calibration strategy will use the estimates from Aaronson and French (2004)
to pin down "
.
143.4 Government, annuity, and credit market
The government taxes consumption, capital income, and labor income. The tax revenue is
used to nance government expenditures. Individuals can insure mortality risk in fair annuity
markets. Denoting by R the gross interest rate net of capital income taxes k; the gross
interest rate faced by an individual j years old with education e is given by
R
e







(1   k); (10)
where e
j is the conditional probability that an age j  1 individual with education e survives
to age j. We assume that individuals cannot borrow.
Social security. The government also administers a pay-as-you-go social security system.
To nance pensions for retired individuals, the government uses a payroll tax ss. Individuals
retire at age 65. Social security benets depend on the average earnings made by individuals
over the 35 highest years of earnings. Denoting this average earnings by w, social security
benets can be expressed as bs(w).
Social security benets are a function of the Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME)
over the 35 highest earnings years. Given that the model period is a quadrimester, for com-
putational simplicity we compute average quadrimesterly earnings over the 35  3 highest
quadrimesterly earnings as follows
wj+1 = wj + zw(hj)=(35  3) for j  35  3; (11)
wj+1 = wj + maxf0;(minfzw(hj);b yg   wj)=(35  3)g for j > 35  3; (12)
where b y is the maximum taxable earnings by the social security administration, which is set
at 2:47 the average earnings in the economy. We express (11)-(12) in the following compact
way:
w
0 =  ss(w;zw(h)): (13)
At retirement, the Social Security Administration computes the Primary Insurance Amount
(PIA) which is the sum of three portions of the Average Index Monthly Earnings (AIME).
The bend points in the PIA formula are 0:2 and 1:24 of the average earnings in the economy
when individuals le for social security (W).14 The social security benet is given by the






0:90  w for w < 0:2W;
0:90  0:2W + 0:33  ( w   0:2W) for w 2 (0:2W;1:24W];
0:90  0:2W + 0:33  (1:24W   0:2W) + 0:15  ( w   1:24W) for w > 1:24W:
(14)
3.5 The individual's problem
We use recursive language to describe the problem of an individual. To simplify the notation,
we abstract from the fact that the education type of an individual determines his earnings and
mortality processes. Then, the state of an individual is given by his age j, assets a, average
lifetime earnings w, and earnings shock z.
Since individuals live for at most J periods, we set VJ+1() = 0. Individuals retire exoge-









0 = bs + Rja   c(1 + c);
a
0  0:









0 = (1   ss   h + 0:5ssh)minfzw(h);b yg + (1   h)maxfzw(h)   b y;0g






l = h   1:
The individual takes as given the earnings per eective labor schedule w(h) and the function
 ss which determines the evolution of average lifetime earnings. In addition, the Social Secu-
rity Administration does not tax earnings above b y. Half of the social security taxes are paid
by the employer and are not subject to the personal income tax h.
163.6 Discussion on nonlinear earnings and labor supply decisions
The eects of nonlinear earnings on labor supply decisions can be illustrated with the following










c = w(h) + X;
where X denotes nonlabor income and w(h) = h
"
 for some constant . The FOC necessary















 1  '(1   h)
  = u2(c;1   h) = MC(h): (18)
When earnings are a linear function of hours (the case of " = ), the MB (marginal benet)
and MC (marginal cost) curves intersect only once and there is a unique local maximum (see
Panel a in Figure 4). Since the second order conditions are satised, the local maximum is
also a global maximum. When earnings are a nonlinear function of hours worked (the case of
" > ), the MC and MB curves intersect twice. Now there is a local minimum and a local
maximum represented by points A and B on Panel b in Figure 4. The local maximum is not
necessarily a global maximum as there maybe a corner solution with hours of work equal to
zero   this will occur when the area between the MC and MB curves to the left of point
A is bigger than the area between the MC and MB curves between the points A and B, as
illustrated on Panel b. A decrease in nonlabor income X shifts up the MB curve, making it
less likely that a corner solution will arise since the area between the MC and MB curves to
the left of A decreases while the area between the MC and MB curves between points A and
B increases.
In the dynamic model with idiosyncratic shocks z, the FOC on labor hours at age j implies:
ln(1   hj)   
1

fln(1   ) + ln(zjw
0(hj)) + lnj   ln'g with equality if hj > 0; (19)
where j denotes the marginal utility of wealth at age j, zj   the age-j productivity shock,
and    the tax rate on earnings. Note that for a xed j, the FOC on labor supply (19) is the
one in the static problem (see equation (18)). Hence, as in the static labor supply problem,
the dynamic problem can feature a corner solution, a local minimum, and a local maximum.
Assuming an interior solution in the labor supply decisions, using the Euler equation, and
the fact that, under rational expectations, innovations to the marginal utility of wealth at age
17j + 1 (j+1) should be uncorrelated with j gives15

























0(h)) = ln(wh(h)): (21)
Combining (20) and (21) gives a Frisch-elasticity of leisure l =   1
; which is equal to the
expression obtained in a model with linear earnings. Hence, nonlinear earnings do not aect
the Frisch-elasticity of labor supply along the intensive margin (see Aaronson and French
(2009) for a related discussion.)
4 Calibration
The calibration of the model requires taking a stand on the value of the parameter  deter-
mining the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure. As we shall see, this parameter
is important for how labor supply varies over the life cycle and how it responds to productivity
shocks. Rather than calibrating , our approach is to x exogenously a range of values for the
parameter  and to calibrate the model economy for each of these values. We then evaluate
how the calibrated model economies match the facts.
The crucial task in our calibration is the parameterization of the stochastic process on
labor productivity through an indirect inference approach. The estimation of this process
exploits the fact that our theory of nonlinear earnings provides a very natural way to identify
the measurement error in hours in the data. The calibration sets the model period to 1
quadrimester (a 4-month period) in order to model the variation in employment within a year.
This choice allows us to use employment data, such as the fraction of individuals working all
three quadrimesters in a year, from the Survey of Income and Participation Program (SIPP),
which interviews individuals three times in a year (rather than once a year as in the PSID).
The SIPP, however, is longitudinally fairly short to allow us to estimate the stochastic process
for wages. As a result, we use the PSID for this purpose. In calibrating a quadrimesterly
stochastic process on labor productivity, one diculty arises from the fact that the PSID only
reports earnings and hours of work at an annual frequency. Moreover, in using wage data to
calibrate a stochastic process on labor productivity we need to take a stand on how hours of
work aect labor productivity, and we need to consider that the data only report wages for
15j+1 = Ejj+1 + j+1
18individuals that work. To deal with these problems, we follow an indirect inference approach
(see Smith (1990), Gourieroux et al. (1993), and Guvenen and Smith (2010)):
1. Estimate an annual wage prole and wage process for college and non-college workers
from the PSID data.
2. Use estimates from Aaronson and French (2004) on nonlinear earnings to pin down
the parameter " determining how hours of work aect labor productivity in the model
economy.
3. Feed a quadrimesterly labor productivity process into the model economy.
4. Simulate the model economy to obtain quadrimesterly data on employment, hours of
work, and earnings.
5. Aggregate the quadrimesterly data to an annual period.
6. Estimate an annual wage prole and wage process for college and non-college workers
in the model generated data.
7. Feed a new quadrimesterly labor productivity process (go back to step 3), until the
\same" annual wage prole and wage process is obtained in the model and in the data.
Below we describe the calibration in detail. We rst discuss the calibration of the \macro"
parameters and then proceed with a discussion of the calibration of the labor productivity
process and how we deal with the possibility of measurement error in hours and earnings in
the PSID data.
4.1 Calibration of preferences, technology, and macro parameters
The model period is set to one quadrimester (4 months). The model economy is solved in
partial equilibrium for a xed interest rate. The quadrimesterly interest rate is chosen so that
the implied annual rate of return on capital (net of depreciation) is 4%.16
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution of leisure. We calibrate model economies
with  = 1:8, 2:0, and 2:2 so that the intertemporal elasticity of leisure varies from 0.56 to
0.45 across the calibrated model economies. We also attempted to calibrate model economies
16The depreciation over a yearly period is assumed to be 4%. Because the model economy is solved in
partial equilibrium, the depreciation rate does not aect any of the results in the next section of the paper.
19with values of  below 1.8 and above 2.2 but these economies turn out to match quite poorly
the calibration targets and the rest of the micro level facts.
Preference parameters, time endowments, and mortality rates. Following Kaplan
and Violante (2010), the discount factor  is chosen to match an asset to income ratio of 2.5.
This is the wealth to income ratio when the top 5% of households in the wealth distribution
are excluded from the Survey of Consumer Finances. The reason for excluding the richest
households in computing an aggregate wealth to income ratio is that the PSID undersam-
ples the top of the wealth distribution. Following Osuna and R os-Rull (2003) and Prescott
(2004), the time endowment is set at 5200 hours a year (100 hours per week). The preference
parameter ', determining the taste for leisure, is chosen so that prime age individuals, aged
30 to 45, work annually about 42% of their available time. The mortality risk for college and
non-college individuals is taken from Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2006).
Technology parameters. The labor share  is set to 0:64. In order to calibrate the parameter







Note that the elasticity of the wage rate to a change in hours of work is given by "
  1. In an
empirical study, Aaronson and French (2004) estimate this elasticity to be around 0:40. This
estimate implies that a full time (40 hours a week) worker earns an hourly wage 25% higher
than a part time (20 hours) worker. We thus set " = 1:4 .
Tax rates and social security. The tax rate on consumption c is set at 0:055 as in Conesa
et al. (2009). Following Domeij and Heathcote (2004), taxes on capital income and labor
income are set to k = 0:40 and h = 0:27. The social security tax rate is set to ss = 0:12;
and the cap b y on social security taxation is xed at 2:47 of average earnings in the economy
(W).17
4.2 Calibration of labor productivity
We use a GMM procedure to estimate the following annual wage process in the PSID data
for college and non-college individuals:
ln(c wh)ij = xj + i + uj + j; (23)
17Actually, W is set at 80% of average earnings in the economy. The reason is that our model only includes
male workers. Using data from the CPS, we nd that the average earnings among all workers in the US
economy are about 80% of the average earnings of male workers.
20where ln(c wh)ij represents the observed log hourly wage of individual i at age j in the PSID









j) is an idiosyncratic transitory shock which
is age-dependent, and uj follows a rst-order autoregression:






); u0 = 0: (24)
While the parameters (;;2
;2
;2
j) vary across education types, this is omitted in the
notation to avoid clutter. The estimated wage processes are reported in Table 2. The empirical
ndings show that the variance of the xed eects is quite large for both education types,
with values of 0:097 and 0:072 for the non-college and the college types. Both wage processes
exhibit high autocorrelation, with a value of 0:94 for non-college individuals and 0:98 for
college individuals. The variance of the innovation of the autoregressive process is 0:019 and
0:021, respectively. The estimates reveal that both education types exhibit transitory shocks
to wages with quite high variances as reported in Figure 7.
In order to calibrate the model economy, we need to nd a quadrimesterly stochastic
process on labor productivity that is consistent with the annual wage process estimated in
the data (equations (23)-(24)). To do this, we assume that labor productivity is the sum of
an annual autoregressive process and a quadrimesterly transitory shock.18 Specically, while
the transitory shock is drawn every quadrimester, the persistent shock is only drawn at the
rst quadrimester of each year (age). To make these assumptions operational, we discretize
all shocks by considering, for each education type, 15 values for the autoregressive shocks, 4
values for the temporary shocks, and 2 values for the xed eects. The transition probabilities
of the persistent shock are computed using a Tauchen (1986) routine.
The empirical literature has stressed the importance of measurement error in hours and
earnings in household survey data. Moreover our empirical ndings are suggestive of the
importance of measurement error since the estimated variation in the transitory component
of wages seems implausibly large (see Figure 7).
We thus need to address the issue of measurement error in the data. To this end, we
assume that the transitory shock j in the empirical model is the sum of a true temporary
log wage shock and measurement errors in log hours mH and log earnings mE, both of which
are normally distributed with mean zero. The estimated transitory variation in observed
18We have also experimented with a specication that allows for an autoregressive process at the
quadrimesterly level. In this case, however, we were not able to recover the stochastic process estimated
in the data. When labor productivity follows an autoregressive process at the quadrimesterly level, there is
no reason to expect the logarithm of the sum of quadrimesterly earnings to be well approximated with an
autoregressive process.
21transitory log wages j is then the sum of the variances of transitory true log wages 2
Tj,
measurement error in log earnings 2















Hj) in accounting for the estimated variance in observed transitory log wages 2
j.
Thus, we assume that annual hours and earnings are measured with error in the model econ-
omy. To calibrate the variance of true transitory log wages 2
Tj, we note that in our theory this
variance has important eects on the probability that individuals work all three quadrimesters
in a year: the larger 2
Tj is the less likely it is that individuals will work during all periods in a
year. We thus use this statistic as a calibration target where the fraction of individuals work-
ing 3 quadrimesters in a year is taken from the Survey of Income and Participation Program
(SIPP).19 Figure A-4 shows that this fraction is roughly constant for prime-age males (age 30
to 50) but that it decreases substantially after age 50. To mimic the data in a simple way, for
each education group the process for transitory shocks is parameterized with two values 2
T50
and 2
T64, where the variance of the transitory shocks is assumed to be equal to 2
T50 up to
age 50 and then increasing linearly up to the value 2
T64.20
To distinguish between 2
Ej and 2
Hj, we need an additional target.21 This is done by
comparing the variance of transitory wages in two alternative estimations of the wage process
in (23)-(24). The rst specication estimates the process for observed wages while the second
specication estimates the process for wages net of the eect of hours worked on wages.
Identication comes from the fact that measurement errors in hours and in earnings aect
dierently the variance of transitory wages in the two specications of the regression. To
develop this point, we start by noticing that when earnings are a nonlinear function of hours,












where b x denotes the observed value for the variable x in the data. In the absence of measure-
ment error, the wage rate net of the eect of hours on wages would be uncovered by taking
19We note that the SIPP allows us to have more reliable measures of labor force participation at the
quadrimesterly frequency than the PSID as it interviews individuals three times in a year (rather than once
a year as in the PSID).
20The value of 2
T50 is 0.0179 for non-college and 0.0148 for college while 2
T64 takes the value 0.0151 for
non-college and 0.0097 for college.




22logs and subtracting ("
   1)lnh from both sides of (26):












sides of equation (26) to \clean" wages from the eect of observed hours gives


















which can be re-arranged as










If z follows the empirical model in (23)-(24), then we obtain the following empirical model for
\clean" wages:










The transitory variation in \clean wages" is then given by














When earnings are a nonlinear function of hours worked ("
 > 1) and the wage process is
estimated net of the eect of hours on wages, measurement error in hours leads to an increase
in the estimated transitory variation of wages. Intuitively, this happens because we are not
using the \correct" hours to clean the wage data. Comparing (29) with (25), the increase in










For the calibrated value of "






' 1 so that V AR = 2
H.
Thus, for each education type, the variance of the measurement error in hours 2
H is obtained
as the increase in the transitory variance in wages when the wage data is \cleaned" with
hours data. We then introduce the estimates for measurement error in hours into the model
economy and run the two specications of the wage regression with model simulated data.
Reassuringly, as discussed above, when the estimation is performed on clean wages the variance
of the transitory component in wages increases by an amount approximately equal to the
measurement error in hours estimated in the data.
234.3 Calibration results
Overall, we nd that there is a \tight" range of values of  (going from 1.8 to 2.2) for which
the calibrated model economies match well the calibration targets and other relevant micro
facts. Hence, below we set the economy with  equal to 2 as our baseline economy and discuss
in detail its performance. While the analysis mostly focuses on the baseline economy, we
compare how the parameter  aects the individual and aggregate labor supply responses
across the calibrated model economies.
Unless otherwise indicated, we only report the results for the baseline economy ( = 2).
We calibrate the model parameters by solving the model economy. Table 3 shows the values
and the calibration targets for three of these parameters: the average earnings in the economy
W, the taste for leisure ', and the discount factor . For each education group, we use an
indirect inference approach to pin down a quartic polynomial for the wage age-prole, the
stochastic process of wages, and the variance of measurement error in hours and earnings.
4.3.1 Wages: age prole and stochastic process
Since in our baseline economy there is an active extensive margin in labor supply decisions,
individuals who work are a non-random selection of the population. Hence, we cannot me-
chanically plug an age-prole for wages into our model. Nonetheless, Figure 5 shows that the
baseline economy matches almost exactly the age-prole of wages for both education groups.
Table 4 reports the values of the parameters characterizing the AR(1) process as well as the
standard deviation of the xed eect shock aecting labor productivity for non-college and
college types. This table also reports the targeted statistics which are the estimated variance
of the xed eect and the parameters of the AR(1) process for log wages (also in Table 2).
The values reported under the column Model correspond to the GMM estimation using annual
model data from the baseline economy.
As explained in the calibration procedure, the process for transitory shocks is parameter-
ized with two values 2
T50 and 2
T64, where the variance of transitory shocks is assumed to be
equal to 2
T50 up to age 50 and that it then changes linearly to the value 2
T64. The targets
are the fractions of prime-aged males (age 35-50) and males aged 50-64 that work all three
quadrimesters in a year. The calibration results in 2
T50 equal to 0.0179 for non-college and
0.0148 for college individuals, while 2
T64 takes the value 0.0151 for non-college and 0.0097
for college. Hence, to match the fact that in the data non-college individuals are less likely
to work three quadrimesters in a year, the calibration implies that non-college individuals
are subject to larger true temporary shocks than college individuals. The model replicates
24reasonably well the fraction of people working 3 quadrimesters in a year, though for young
non-college individuals the calibration tends to slightly overpredict the fraction of individuals
working all periods in a year (see Figure 6).
4.3.2 Measurement error
To estimate the measurement error in hours our calibration procedure compares the variance
of transitory wages in two alternative estimations of the wage process both in actual and in
model data. The rst specication estimates the wage process using data on observed wages
while the second specication estimates the process for wages net of the eects of hours worked
on wages. Regarding the rst specication, Figure 7 shows that the model matches well the
age-prole for the variance of the transitory component of residual log wages in the data for
both education groups. Figure A-5 shows that the model also matches well the variance of
the transitory component for \clean" wages. Measurement error in hours is obtained as the
dierence between the variance of transitory wages across the two specications for the wage
process. The results for measurement error in hours are reported in Figure A-6. We nd
that measurement error in hours is higher for non-college than for college individuals. The
age-prole of measurement error is slightly U-shaped for non-college individuals: the variance
takes a value of around 0.03 for very young individuals, is below 0.03 for prime-aged males,
and increases to 0.05 when individuals are close to the retirement age. For college individuals,
the variance in measurement error is about 0.02 for most of the life cycle, with a mild increase
to 0.04 prior to retirement.
5 Quantitative ndings: the performance of the base-
line economy
5.1 Hours worked
Figures 8-12 present the performance of the baseline economy in accounting for the facts on
labor supply documented in Section 2. Overall, the baseline economy captures most of the
salient features of labor supply. Recall that the facts on labor supply were not explicitly
targeted, indicating that the features included in the analysis are important determinants of
individuals' labor supply decisions.
Age prole of hours of work. Figure 8 displays mean annual hours over the life cycle in
the model and for various cohorts in the data. The model captures very well the fact that
working hours over the life cycle are roughly at up to age 45 and that they decrease steeply
25after age 45 (though it does not account for all the decline in hours late in the life cycle).
The model matches fairly well the decline in working hours among individuals with positive
hours of work as shown in Figure 9. Our baseline economy with an intertemporal elasticity
of leisure of 0.5 accounts for the low comovement of hours and wages early in the life-cycle,
when wages are rising rapidly but hours are relatively at. Incomplete markets are crucial for
this result.22 While individuals face an increasing age prole of wages, they work long hours
when young because they need to build a buer stock of savings to self-insure against income
risk. By age 50 the stock of assets is suciently large, and individuals can aord to take a
quadrimester o work when they receive a low realization of the temporary wage shock. This
accounts for the pronounced decline in annual working hours late in the life cycle.
Table 5 presents and summarizes the cross-sectional distribution of labor supply in the
model and in the data. We capture the cross-sectional distribution of labor supply by restrict-
ing the analysis to a quadrimesterly level both in the model and in the SIPP data. In order
to analyze the extensive margin, we use a probit regression of employment on age, education,
and assets. For the analysis on the intensive margin we use an OLS regression of log hours on
age, education, and assets.23 Age ranges from 25 to 65, assets are in thousands, and education
is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if the individual is a college graduate and
zero otherwise.24
The results in Table 5 indicate that labor supply both on the intensive and the extensive
margin declines with age.25 Quantitatively, this decline is quite similar in the model and in
the data. The model also quantitatively captures the fact that college graduates work more  
both on the intensive and the extensive margin   even though this eect is less pronounced in
the model than in the data. Finally, while it seems that assets have a positive eect on labor
supply at the intensive margin and a negative eect at the extensive margin, these eects
are quantitatively very small both in the model and in the data. For instance, an increase in
22Imai and Keane (2004) develop a theory with human capital accumulation that accounts for the comove-
ment of hours and wages early in the life cycle with an intertemporal elasticity of labor supply of 3.8. However,
this high intertemporal elasticity results in hours worked declining much too steeply relative to the data in
the second half of the life cycle, a point recently shown by Wallenius (2009).
23We are using the 1990 SIPP Panel in the analysis. Assets data is reported only for wave 4 (out of 8),
and we use the information only at that point. We construct two series for assets: the rst includes both own
and joint assets while the second includes own assets plus half of the joint assets. SIPP writes the joint asset
information either in the husband's or the wife's record, but not both. We match couples in order to obtain
the information about joint assets. Assets are classies into 6 large groups: house, mobile home, other real
estate, vehicles, nancial assets, and rental properties and other real estate. We use net assets by subtracting
liabilities. Further, the reported results are obtained using only the nancial assets information (liquid net
wealth), excluding mortgages and Individual Retirement Accounts.
24The analysis on the SIPP data also includes a race dummy variable.
25Table A-6 reports the results when the analysis is performed separately for college and non-college.
26assets by $10,000 decreases the probability of being employed by 0.3% in the model and 0.06%
in the data. It seems that in this simple correlation analysis, once we take into account the
eect of age and education, the additional eect of assets on labor supply is small. It is indeed
the case that individuals with more assets have a lower probability of being employed, but in
the regression analysis this is mainly captured by the age variable since older individuals tend
to be also wealthier.
We emphasize that life cycle is important for generating a low correlation between assets
and non-employment spells. When the time horizon is innite and labor productivity follows
an autoregressive process, an individual receiving a low labor productivity shock understands
that his labor productivity will eventually revert to the mean. His optimal decision is then
not to work as long as consumption can be nanced with non-labor income. Since forward
looking individuals understand that they are likely to receive low productivity shocks in the
future, they build precautionary savings in order to nance the non-employment spells during
periods of low labor productivity. This mechanism explains why Castaneda et al. (1998) nd
that non-employed individuals counterfactually tend to be too asset rich in their innitely
lived framework (see also Chang and Kim (2006)). On the other hand, in a life-cycle model
the nite horizon makes individuals less willing to take long spells out of employment for
two reasons. First, young individuals do not have a buer stock of assets to nance non-
employment (at least for long spells). Second, a nite life implies that middle-aged and old
individuals, who are asset rich, may start receiving high productivity shocks too late in their
life cycle and thus may not be able to benet from the good realizations of the productivity
shocks or benet from them for only a short period of time.
Dispersion in hours of work. Figure 10 shows the dispersion of annual hours worked
over the life cycle both in the model and in the data. For both education types, the model
captures the fact that the dispersion in working hours is at for prime-age males and that
it increases substantially late in the life cycle. Again, incomplete markets account for these
ndings. When individuals are young, the dispersion in hours is low because most individuals
are working long hours to self-insure against income risk. After age 45, most individuals have
a buer stock of savings that allows them to take some periods o work and the dispersion in
working hours rises substantially. The baseline economy underpredicts the dispersion in hours
worked but this should not be surprising as the model abstracts from many factors that could
lead to heterogeneity in working hours across individuals. In considering what these factors
may be, it is suggestive that the baseline economy underpredicts the heterogeneity in lifetime
labor supply (see Table 1). While in the data the coecient of variation in lifetime labor
27supply (labor supply over a ten year period) for individuals aged 35 to 45 and aged 45 to 55 is
0:26 and 0:37, this statistic takes values of 0:11 and 0:16 in the baseline economy for the two
age groups considered. Hence, it seems that the theory abstracts from some factors leading to
persistent dierences in working hours across individuals in the U.S., such as heterogeneity in
health, preferences, or demographics. This observation is supported by the ndings of Bils et
al. (2009) who model and calibrate permanent dierences in tastes for work across individuals
to match micro facts in the US economy.
Persistence in annual hours worked. Following the data analysis in Section 2, we divide
individuals in the baseline economy into four groups according to their annual working hours:
The rst group corresponds to individuals who do not work (annual hours less than 100);
the second group is given by individuals who work part time (annual hours between 100 and
1500); the third group corresponds to people working full time (annual hours between 1500
and 2800); and the fourth includes individuals working overtime (annual hours greater than
2800). Figure 11 shows the relative size of each of these groups over the life cycle both in the
model and in the data. Two observations stand out. First, the model captures the fact that
Group 3 (people working between 1500 and 2800 hours) is by far the largest group and that
its share only declines signicantly after age 55. Second, the model mimics the observation
that the size of Group 1 (individuals working between 0 and 100 hours) in the data is very
small for people younger than 50, but then rises substantially late in the life cycle.
Figure 12 shows the persistence in annual hours worked both in the model and in the data.
First, the model captures the fact that individuals working between 1500 and 2800 hours in a
year (Group 3) are quite likely to be in the same group the year after. Second, the model also
mimics the observation that early in the life cycle people who do not work in a given year tend
not to stay in the same group the year after. Later in the life cycle, however, non-participation
becomes an absorbent group since non-working individuals tend to stay in that group with a
very high probability. Finally, the other two groups are not very big and tend to be transitory
  individuals end up in those groups every now and then, but tend to quickly exit them.
Distribution of hours. Figure 13 compares the distribution of hours in a quadrimester
both in the model and in the data for two education groups and three age groups. The model
mimics the facts that the distribution of hours is highly concentrated around 600 hours and
has a spike at zero. As previously discussed, the fraction of individuals working zero hours
increases with age because older individuals are richer and can aord to take periods o work.
The fraction of people working zero hours is highest for non-college individuals than for college
28individuals, especially for the older age groups. This is explained by the fact that non-college
individuals have a atter age prole of wages and face (slightly) lower transitory shocks to
wages. For all age and education groups the model underpredicts the fraction of individuals
working zero hours.
5.2 Labor supply responses at the individual level
We have shown that the baseline economy matches the calibration targets plus other relevant
micro facts on labor supply. Now, we evaluate the predictions of the theory for changes in
hours and wages at the individual micro level.
5.2.1 Changes in log hours and wages: covariance and correlation
Table 6 shows that both in the baseline economy and in the data the covariance between
changes in log hours and changes in log wages have an inverted U-shape and a negative sign.
The baseline economy matches these data remarkably well. Table 7 shows that the baseline
economy is also successful in predicting the negative correlation between the change in log
hours and the change in log wages in the data, though the quantitative t is not as good as
in the case with the covariances between changes in log wages and log hours.
It is interesting to compare labor supply responses across the calibrated model economies.
While the covariance between changes in hours and wages does not vary much across economies,
it tends to increase with the value of . This result is explained by the fact that our calibration
implies a monotonic relation between  and the variance of the transitory shocks. Recall that
the calibration pins down the variance of transitory shocks in order to match the fraction of
individuals working three quadrimesters in a year. Note that an increase in , ceteris paribus,
makes individuals less willing to work long hours because of the higher curvature of the utility
function. Hence, to match the target for working hours (42%) the calibration of the model
requires that the weight of leisure (') in the utility function decreases with . A decrease in
the value of leisure ' also implies that individuals are less willing to take periods o work,
thereby implying that the variance of transitory shocks should increase with  in order to
match the calibration target for the fraction of people working 3 quadrimesters in a year.
Since transitory shocks have a small wealth eect, the increase in the variance of transitory
shocks leads to a higher covariance of hours and wages.
295.2.2 The empirical elasticity of labor supply
While the majority of empirical studies on the labor supply of men estimate low elasticities,
there is no clear consensus on the magnitude of this elasticity. Furthermore, it is well known
that there are many serious econometric problems in estimating the elasticity of labor supply
(see Keane (2010) and Keane and Rogerson (2011) for a recent survey of the literature).
Nevertheless, our model economy is consistent with a very low empirical elasticity of labor
supply. We simulate micro data from the model economy and estimate an \empirical elasticity
of labor supply" with standard econometric techniques. We nd that the empirical estimates
in the model simulated data imply a very low empirical Frisch elasticity of labor supply  
depending on various specications it is in the range of [ 0:07;0:36], which is well within the
range of [0;0:5] reported in various empirical studies.26 Similar to the ndings in Imai and
Keane (2004), Domeij and Flod en (2006), and Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) the estimated
elasticities are lower than the Frisch elasticity of labor supply hard-wired in the calibration of
the model economy (i.e., the \theoretical elasticity of labor supply"). As discussed in Section
3.6, the Frisch elasticity of leisure along the intensive margin in the model with nonlinear
earnings is l =   1
, which is the same as in a model with linear earnings. It is standard to
convert the elasticity of leisure into a labor supply elasticity by setting h =  
(1 h)
h l. Hence,
the theoretical Frisch elasticities of leisure and labor in the baseline economy are l =  0:5
and h = 0:61.27
6 Aggregate labor supply responses
The analysis so far has demonstrated that the model developed earlier is able to match quan-
titatively quite well the facts on labor supply at the individual level. Therefore, it is an
appropriate tool for studying aggregate labor supply responses to changes in the economic
environment. The model allows us to explicitly aggregate up from each individual's response,
as well as analyze the response in various parts of the age, education, asset, and productivity
shocks distribution.
We start by studying the aggregate labor supply response to two dierent types of changes
in the economic environment. The rst experiment involves a one period unanticipated wage
change. The wealth eect of such a change is negligible, and we can use the corresponding
26In the Appendix we describe the procedure in greater detail, and we also discuss the importance of time
aggregation and the extensive margin on the estimated low empirical labor supply elasticity.
27To map the elasticity of leisure into an elasticity of labor, we use that the median value of (1   h)=h in
our model economy is 1:22.
30change in aggregate labor supply in order to obtain an estimate of its Frisch elasticity. The
second experiment involves a permanent (compensated) wage change in which we permanently
increase the labor income tax rate and redistribute back the tax receipts. This experiment
is designed to provide a measure of the compensated Hicksian elasticity of aggregate labor
supply. Furthermore, we also simulate the 1987 tax holiday in Iceland   a quasi natural
experiment   and nd that the aggregate labor supply responses in the model are similar to
those actually observed in Iceland and reported in Bianchi et al. (2001). Finally, we discuss
the fact that the model is also consistent with the cross-country evidence on labor supply late
in the life cycle (after the age of 50) and analyze the eect of nonlinear earnings on the results.
6.1 The Frisch elasticity of aggregate labor supply
We simulate a one-period (quadrimester) unanticipated wage increase of 2 percent. The results
are reported in Table 8. We nd that the Frisch elasticity of aggregate labor supply in our
baseline economy is 1:27, which is twice as big as the theoretical Frisch elasticity embedded in
the calibration of the model (0:61). The large labor supply response along the extensive margin
explains why the Frisch elasticity is much bigger than the theoretical elasticity (recall that
the latter was derived assuming an interior solution in the labor supply decision.) Restricting
attention to labor supply changes along the intensive margin decreases the Frisch elasticity
from 1:27 to 0:58. Hence, the extensive margin accounts for about 54% of the aggregate labor
supply response to a temporary wage change.
Not surprisingly, the Frisch elasticity of aggregate labor supply in the model economy is
sensitive to the value of  determining the i.e.s.: as  varies in the tight range between 1.8
to 2.2, the Frisch elasticity decreases from 1.56 to 1.07 (see Table 8). Table 9 reports the
elasticity of labor supply for dierent age groups in the baseline economy. The elasticity of
labor supply increases steeply with age: it rises from 1.0 for individuals aged 25-35, to 1.98 for
individuals aged 55-64. While the response along the intensive margin is roughly at over the
life cycle, the wage elasticity of employment rises from 0.38 for individuals aged 26-35 to 1.56
for people aged 55-64. The employment of old individuals is very responsive to temporary
wage changes because they, on average, have a buer stock of savings that allows them to
smooth consumption well in response to an unanticipated wage shock. On the contrary, young
individuals are less responsive in their labor supply because they are poorer and they need to
build a stock of precautionary savings to insure against income risk over the life cycle.
Unfortunately, there is no direct micro evidence on the wage elasticity of employment to
unanticipated temporary shocks (or over the business cycles). The key diculty is that wages
31are only observed for employed people. To deal with this missing wage problem, Kimmel
and Kniesner (1998) extend the Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) analysis to estimate a labor
supply equation jointly with a participation decision rule and an oer wage function at sub-
annual periods. They use SIPP data and instrument for wage rates using nonlinear age and
time trends. While these instruments are not beyond dispute, they nd that the extensive
margin accounts for almost 70% of the wage elasticity of labor supply, with an estimate of
the wage elasticity of labor supply of 1.25 and a wage elasticity of employment of 0.86.28
These estimates are quite close to our ndings for a one period small wage change (aggregate
elasticity of 1.27, with the extensive margin contributing 0.69). Our theory calibrated to micro
data on hours and wages is consistent with a Frisch elasticity of aggregate labor supply well
above 1. Nonetheless, our estimate for the employment elasticity is well below the value of
2 needed to match the business cycle data along the extensive margin, as argued by Chetty
et al. (2011). These authors claim that it is important to model unemployment or demand-
driven movements on the employment rate for understanding employment uctuations over
the business cycle. Our results are consistent with this view.
6.2 The Hicks elasticity of aggregate labor supply
To evaluate the compensated elasticity to a permanent wage change, we simulate an increase
in the labor income tax from 0.27 in the baseline economy to 0.37. Tax proceeds are assumed
to be rebated with a lump sum transfer to working-age individuals. The amount of the transfer
is education-specic so that there is no income redistribution across education types. We nd
that the elasticities for both the intensive and extensive margins are reduced by half relative
to the case of a temporary wage change (see Table 8). Now the labor supply elasticity is
0.65 and the employment elasticity is 0.35, which should be compared to 1.27 and 0.69   the
elasticities from the temporary wage change experiment. Hence, not surprisingly, individuals
respond more strongly to a temporary wage change than to a permanent compensated-wage
change. The age prole of the wage elasticity to the permanent change in wages has a U-
shape. It starts at 0.70 for young individuals, decreases to 0.56 for individuals aged 55-64 and
it increases to 0.72 for people aged 55-64 (see Table 9). Young individuals respond strongly
to the tax increase because the lump sum transfer helps them to smooth consumption. This
eect is stronger for college than non-college individuals since college individuals face a steep
age prole of labor productivity. As a result, the aggregate elasticity for the age group 25-35
28The exclusion restriction is that employment rates do not vary with age conditional on wage rates. Chetty
et al. (2011) argue that the elasticity estimates would be biased upwards if factors that predict high wage
rates also predict high latent tastes for work.
32is higher for college than for non-college individuals (0.81 versus 0.65).
The mean value of the Hicks elasticity of aggregate hours across a number of micro studies
reviewed in Chetty et al. (2011) is 0.76. Consistent with this evidence, our baseline economy
predicts a Hicks elasticity of aggregate hours of work of 0.65. Since this nding also holds
in Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), we conclude that modeling heterogeneity and incomplete
markets is not crucial for the predictions of the theory for the Hicks elasticity of labor supply.
6.3 The Icelandic tax holiday experiment
We simulate the tax holiday that took place in Iceland in 1987. The Icelandic tax holiday is
well suited for identifying Frisch elasticities because it induced an unanticipated temporary
wage variation during the year 1987. In 1987, Iceland moved from a system under which
taxes were paid on the previous year's income to a pay-as-you-earn system. The transition to
the new tax system implied that income during 1987 was never taxed since the tax base in
1987 was income earned in 1986 and the tax base in 1988 was income earned in 1988.29 The
average tax rate was 14.5% in 1986, 0% in 1987, and 8.0% in 1988. In order to mimic the
tax reform in Iceland, we simulate in our baseline economy a one year (three model periods)
reduction in the tax rate of 14.5 percentage points, followed then by a permanent decrease
of 6.5 percentage points in the average tax rate (relative to the initial tax rate of 27% in the
baseline economy).
We nd that the aggregate elasticity of labor supply implied by the Icelandic tax holiday
experiment is 0.68, with extensive and intensive margin elasticities of 0.33 and 0.35, respec-
tively. Remarkably, these elasticity results are not much dierent from the ones estimated by
Bianchi et al. (2001) in the Icelandic micro data: for male workers, they nd an employment
elasticity of 0.58 and an intensive margin elasticity of 0.26.30
We nd much smaller elasticities than the ones reported in Chetty et al. (2011) obtained
by simulating the Icelandic tax holiday in the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) model. This is
due to the fact that our baseline economy with heterogeneous agents and incomplete markets
has a smaller fraction of agents that are close to being indierent between working or not
working than in the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) representative agent model.
The Icelandic tax holiday experiment assumes a temporary wage change that lasts three
model periods (one year). As we discussed earlier, simulating the eects of a one period
29The tax change was unanticipated by households since the announcement of the policy change was made
in late 1986, see Bianchi et al. (2001).
30The extensive margin elasticity is reported in Table 4 in Bianchi et al. (2001). The intensive margin
elasticity is obtained using data from Table 6 in Bianchi et al. (2001).
33(quadrimester) wage increase of 2% delivers an aggregate elasticity of labor supply equal to
1.27, with an extensive margin elasticity of 0.69 (see Table 8). The extensive margin response
is larger than the one obtained in the Icelandic experiment (0.33) for three reasons. First, the
change in wages lasts only one period (quadrimester) rather than three model periods (one
year) and the scope for intertemporal substitution is higher in the case of a one period wage
change. Moving from a one quadrimester to a one year change decreases the employment
elasticity from 0.69 to 0.61. Second, the employment response in our model is nonlinear in
the size of the wage change: the employment elasticity to a one-year wage change drops from
0.61 to 0.41 when the size of the wage change increases from 2% to 18%. Third, the Icelandic
tax experiment combines a one-year temporary change with a permanent wage change, which
further decreases the employment elasticity from 0.41 to 0.33.
6.4 Intertemporal substitution and labor supply late in the life
cycle
There are substantial cross-country dierences in labor supply late in the life cycle (age 50+).
In many countries the social security provisions impose explicit and implicit taxes on the
labor earnings of individuals that are close to the normal retirement age, encouraging these
individuals to reduce their labor supply and withdraw from the labor market before the nor-
mal retirement age (Gruber and Wise, eds (1999)). The cross-country heterogeneity in labor
supply and social security provisions present us with the opportunity to test the predictions
of our theory. In Erosa et al. (2012) we extend our baseline economy to model in detail the
variation in the social security, disability insurance, and taxation institutions across European
countries and the United States. We nd that the extended baseline model economy accounts
well for the observed cross-country dierences in labor supply late in the life cycle, indicating
that the Frisch elasticity of labor supply in our model economy is plausible. That the model
economy would pass this test was not obvious: Imai and Keane (2004) estimate an intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution in labor supply of 3.82 in a structural model of human capital
accumulation and labor supply decisions tted to NLSY data on hours and wages of young
individuals (aged 20-36). However, Wallenius (2009) shows that the estimated model of Imai
and Keane (2004) counterfactually implies a too sharp reduction in working hours late in the
life cycle (age 50+).
346.5 Discussion on nonlinear earnings
Nonlinear earnings and aggregate labor supply responses. A distinguishing feature
of our theory is that nonlinear earnings imply that the aggregate elasticity of labor supply
is substantially larger than the theoretical elasticity implied by the calibration of preference
parameters. This is because the theoretical elasticity only describes labor supply responses
along the intensive margin, thereby neglecting labor supply responses along the extensive
margin. Imai and Keane (2004) and Domeij and Flod en (2006) are two closely related papers
that argue that standard econometric estimates of the elasticity of labor supply may be biased
downwards. However, these papers cannot account for large aggregate labor supply responses
because they do not model the extensive margin.
Imai and Keane (2004) estimate a very large value for the intertemporal elasticity of
substitution (i.e.s.) of labor   roughly about 4. The key to their large estimate is that the
incentives to supply labor in their framework are driven by the sum of the wage rate and the
returns to human capital accumulation. When the returns to human capital are large, labor
supply responds little to wage changes leading to high estimates of the i.e.s. Notice, however,
that this reasoning also implies that labor supply should not be very responsive to aggregate
wage shocks. Indeed, Imai and Keane (2004) simulate the eects of a one-period change in
the wage rate of 2% and nd that the average labor supply change for individuals aged 30 to
50 is about 1:5%, a much smaller response than the 8% predicted by the estimated i.e.s. of
4. On the contrary, in our paper the labor supply response to a temporary wage change is
more than twice the value predicted by the i.e.s. parameter. In our framework with nonlinear
earnings, temporary wage changes have a large eect on the extensive margin leading to labor
supply responses larger than those implied by the i.e.s. parameter. Our ndings provide an
explanation for the evidence in Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) of a highly wage-elastic extensive
margin at subannual periods in the SIPP data.
Domeij and Flod en (2006) argue that standard econometric estimates of the elasticity of
labor supply may be biased downwards due to the presence of liquidity constraints. The idea
is that individuals who are liquidity constrained may not be able to reduce their labor supply
when they are hit by a negative temporary wage shock. Since consumption smoothing can only
be achieved by an increase in labor supply, the labor-supply response of liquidity constrained
individuals is thus smaller or of the opposite sign that what is predicted by an analysis that
ignores such constraints. Note, again, that this reasoning also implies that labor supply should
not be very responsive to aggregate wage shocks. In fact, this intuition is conrmed with an
experiment where we simulate a one period unanticipated wage change in an economy with
35linear wages.31 We nd that with linear wages there is no response at the extensive margin
and the aggregate elasticity is quite close to the theoretical elasticity.
Our paper builds on some important recent contributions. In a model of indivisible labor,
Chang and Kim (2006) show that the slope of the aggregate labor supply schedule is deter-
mined by the distribution of reservation wages rather than by the willingness to substitute
leisure intertemporally, establishing that when the extensive margin is operative aggregation
plays a crucial role in determining aggregate labor supply responses. More recently, Rogerson
and Wallenius (2009) develop a theory of nonlinear earnings that provides some qualitative
insights showing that the aggregate labor supply response to permanent tax changes is unre-
lated to the theoretical elasticity of labor supply implied by preference parameters. We build
a closely related theory with heterogeneous agents. Our contribution is to build a theory of
aggregation   disciplined with micro data   and to test the predictions of the theory for labor
supply responses.
Nonlinear earnings vs. xed costs of work. It is interesting to compare labor supply
responses in our baseline economy to those of an alternative theory of the extensive margin.
We thus evaluate aggregate labor supply responses in a model with linear wages in which the
extensive margin is active because of xed costs of work.32 We nd that the economy with
xed costs of work has a much lower labor supply elasticity both at the intensive and extensive
margins. While the labor supply elasticity to a temporary wage change is 1.27 in the baseline
economy, it is 0.59   less than a half   in the economy with xed costs of work. The elasticity
at the extensive margin is reduced by more than a half (from 0.69 to 0.26). The response to a
permanent compensated-wage change is also much smaller for the economy with xed costs of
work, especially at the extensive margin (from 0.35 to 0.18) (see Table 8). In understanding
these results note that the incentives to work long hours are much weaker in the economy with
xed costs of work than in the economy with nonlinear earnings. First, in the economy with
xed costs of work individuals are less willing to work long hours because the concavity of the
31This economy features incomplete markets and borrowing constraints so that the main dierence with the
economy considered by Domeij and Flod en (2006) is that we model the life cycle.
32Note that in the absence of xed costs of work, the extensive margin is not active in the presence of
linear wages. To keep homotheticity, the xed cost of work is formulated in terms of time rather than goods.
Otherwise, to be consistent with the evidence the xed costs of work would have to change across individuals in
the income distribution, over time, and across countries. This alternative economy is calibrated to the targets
used in the calibration of the baseline economy. We nd that, in order to match the calibration target for the
fraction of people working 3 quadrimesters we need the variance of the transitory wage shocks to be roughly 5
times the variance in the baseline economy with nonlinear earnings. As a result, the calibrated economy with
xed costs of work matches all the calibration targets but the variance of transitory wages, which is higher
than in the data.
36utility function implies that the marginal utility of leisure decreases more steeply with working
hours than in the economy with no xed costs of work. Second, contrary to the nonlinear
earnings economy, the hourly wage rate does not rise with working hours in the economy with
xed costs of work. As a result, the elasticity of labor supply along the intensive margin is
lower in the economy with xed costs of work than in the economy with nonlinear earnings
(0.43 versus 0.61). To understand the low labor supply response at the extensive margin, note
that the more costly it is for individuals to work long hours the more costly it is for them to
take periods o work.33 The economy with xed time costs of work exhibits low labor supply
responses both along the intensive and extensive margins. The nonlinear earnings economy
represents a parsimonious theory of labor supply decisions with an active extensive margin.
Notice that modeling the labor market participation decision in terms of xed costs of work
requires the xed costs to change over time if there is technological progress in the economy,
or to change across individuals for the theory to be consistent with the micro facts on labor
supply, or to take a stand on how the xed costs vary across countries with dierent level of
technology. A key advantage of our theory is that we do not need to take a stand on how
xed costs vary over time, individuals, and space (see Erosa et al. (2012)).
7 Conclusion
We build a micro-founded theory of aggregate labor supply which accounts for choices at both
the intensive and the extensive margin. The key feature of our theory for delivering periods
of non-participation is the nonlinear mapping between hours of work and earnings, which is
convex at low hours of work. This mapping is the competitive equilibrium outcome of an
economy with a production technology in which hours of work and number of workers are
imperfect substitutes. The model captures salient features of labor supply over the life cycle,
which is crucial for a theory of aggregation. We nd that the elasticity of aggregate labor
supply to a one-period wage change is 1.27, a value that is more than twice as large as the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply that was hard-wired into the model through the calibration
of the preference parameters. Consistent with the empirical evidence, the aggregate labor
supply response is mostly driven by the extensive margin. Nonlinear earnings are crucial for a
substantial response at the extensive margin and deliver a parsimonious theory of individual
labor supply and aggregate responses. We test the predictions of the theory for aggregate
labor supply responses with some of the quasi-experimental evidence reviewed in Chetty et
33This also explains why the calibration of the economy with xed costs of work requires large transitory
shocks to wages.
37al. (2011). We nd that the model economy is consistent with the micro-estimates of the
Hicks elasticity of labor supply (steady-state tax changes). Unlike the ndings reported in
Chetty et al. (2011) regarding the Rogerson and Wallenius (2009) model, we nd that our
theory is consistent with the evidence from the Icelandic temporary tax reduction that took
place in 1987. We conclude that our theory, calibrated to micro data, is consistent with a
Frisch elasticity of aggregate labor supply well above 1. Nonetheless, our estimate for the
employment elasticity is well below the value of 2 needed to match the business cycle data
along the extensive margin. Our theory develops a neoclassical model of labor markets with
life cycle and heterogeneous agents which abstracts from unemployment. This non-trivial
extension is left for future research (see Bils et al. (2009) for an early step in this direction).
38Table 1: The Coecient of Variation in Lifetime and Cross-sectional Hours, Data vs. Model.
Cross-sectional Lifetime
Age Data Model Data Model
26-35 0.36 0.20 0.27 0.08
36-45 0.34 0.22 0.26 0.11
46-55 0.41 0.25 0.37 0.15
56-64 0.86 0.47 0.64 0.36






Parameter Value Variable Target Result
W 3.3 Ratio of mean economy to mean male earnings 0.80 0.82
' 1.0 Fraction of hours worked, age 30-45 42% 42%
 0.9815 Asset to income ratio 2.5 2.6
39Table 4: Calibration of the Stochastic Process for Wages.
Non-College
Parameter Value Variable Target Model
 0.283 Variance of xed component of log wages 0.10 0.09
 0.937 Correlation coecient AR component of log wages 0.94 0.94
 0.138 Variance of innovation AR component of log wages 0.02 0.02
College
Parameter Value Variable Target Model
 0.236 Variance of xed component of log wages 0.07 0.07
 0.972 Correlation coecient AR component of log wages 0.98 0.98
 0.117 Variance of innovation AR component of log wages 0.02 0.02
Table 5: Labor Supply, Intensive and Extensive Margin: Model vs. Data.
Extensive Margin Intensive Margin
Model Data Model Data
age -0.0066 -0.0069 -0.0017 -0.0010
(0.0001) (0.0005) (0.0001) (0.0005)
education 0.0403 0.0931 0.0154 0.0374
(0.0012) (0.0098) (0.0009) (0.0078)
assets -0.0003 -0.00006 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.00006) (0.00002) (0.0001)
Notes: In order to analyze the extensive margin, we use a probit regression of employment on age, education,
and assets. For the analysis on the intensive margin we use an OLS regression of log hours on age, education,
and assets. The analysis on the SIPP data also includes a race dummy variable.
40Table 6: The Covariance Between the Change in Log Hours and the Change in Log Wages,
by Age Groups.
Age 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-64
Data -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
 = 1:8 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04
 = 2:0: Baseline -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03
 = 2:2 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01
 = 2:0: Fixed cost 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01
Table 7: The Correlation Between the Change in Log Hours and the Change in Log Wages,
by Age Groups.
Age 26-35 36-45 46-55 56-64
Data -0.26 -0.27 -0.24 -0.24
 = 1:8 -0.16 -0.11 -0.12 -0.16
 = 2:0: Baseline -0.13 -0.06 -0.06 -0.10
 = 2:2 -0.02 -0.06 0.02 -0.01
 = 2:0: Fixed cost 0.07 0.15 0.11 0.02
41Table 8: Aggregate Labor Supply Elasticity.
Temporary wage increase Permanent wage decrease
Elasticities: Total Employment Intensive Total Employment Intensive
 = 1:8 1.56 0.91 0.65 0.71 0.43 0.28
 = 2:0: Baseline 1.27 0.69 0.58 0.65 0.35 0.30
 = 2:2 1.07 0.55 0.52 0.57 0.27 0.30
 = 2:0: Fixed cost 0.59 0.26 0.33 0.45 0.18 0.27
Table 9: Aggregate Labor Supply Elasticity by Age: Baseline Economy.
Temporary wage increase Permanent wage decrease
Elasticities: Total Employment Intensive Total Employment Intensive
26-35 1.0 0.38 0.62 0.70 0.26 0.43
36-45 1.17 0.53 0.64 0.62 0.31 0.21
46-55 1.35 0.72 0.63 0.56 0.31 0.25
56-64 1.98 1.56 0.42 0.72 0.53 0.18
All 1.27 0.69 0.58 0.65 0.35 0.29
42Table 10: Aggregate Labor Supply Elasticity by Age: The Iceland Experiment.
Non-college College
Elasticities: Total Employment Intensive Total Employment Intensive
26-35 0.50 0.20 0.31 0.46 0.17 0.29
36-45 0.59 0.24 0.35 0.55 0.16 0.38
46-55 0.74 0.37 0.38 0.61 0.20 0.41
56-64 1.21 0.85 0.36 1.12 0.70 0.43
All 0.69 0.35 0.34 0.64 0.27 0.37
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Data Model
Note: On the graphs, by education, wages have been normalized to 1 for the rst age
group.
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SIPP: 1990 panel, High−school and College, 25−62 Years Old
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Model: High−school and College, 25−62 Years Old
Graphs by ind_educ and ind_age
®
Notes: The graphs show the distribution of hours in a 4-month period for age and education groups, in the
data and in the model. Group ij represents a particular age (i) and education (j) group. i: 1. 26-40, 2.
41-55, 3. 56-61; j: 1. non-college, 2. college.
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54APPENDIX
The empirical elasticity of labor supply. The empirical elasticity of labor supply is obtained by estimating
the following regression on model generated data via ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables
(IV):
4lnhit = 0 + 14lnwit + "it; (A-1)
where the regression coecient 1 gives the empirical labor supply elasticity predicted by the model economy.
Since the error term may be correlated with the contemporaneous wage change due to the wealth eect of a
wage change on labor supply, it is standard to follow an instrumental variables approach. The instruments
used are past wage changes (IV1) and a composite of a constant, age, age-squared, and the twice lagged
log-wage (IV2). The ndings are reported in Table A-1.
We nd that all the estimates of the empirical elasticity of labor supply are well below the value predicted
by the theoretical elasticity. The lowest estimates are obtained when using OLS and when instrumenting with
lagged wage changes (IV1). The highest estimates are obtained when instrumenting with a constant, age,
age-squared, and the twice lagged log-wage (IV2). Note that the IV2 instruments use information from the
age-prole of wages and hours to estimate the labor supply elasticity. This procedure identies the elasticity
from anticipated life-cycle wage changes and is particularly good in correcting for measurement error in hours
and wages. In the baseline economy, the empirical elasticity of labor supply obtained with IV2 is 0:36, well
within the range of [0;0:5] in the empirical literature. Interestingly, the theoretical elasticity is equal to 0:61;
almost twice the value implied by the empirical elasticity.
Table A-1: The Elasticity of Labor Supply.
Theoretical OLS IV1 IV2
(lnwt 1) (age,age2,lnwt 2)
 = 1:8 0.68 -0.11 -0.15 0.42
 = 2:0: Baseline 0.61 -0.07 -0.08 0.36
 = 2:2 0.56 -0.01 -0.01 0.26
 = 2:0: Fixed cost 0.44 0.09 0.13 -0.07
Discussion on time aggregation, the extensive margin, and the low empirical elasticity. We have
shown that the extensive margin plays a crucial role in generating the high value of the aggregate elasticity
of labor supply relative to the empirical elasticity estimated with conventional econometric techniques. We
now assume that the econometrician observes all the micro data in our model economy with no measurement
error (such as labor productivity for those individuals who do not work). The question is then: Can the
econometrician recover the aggregate elasticity of labor supply in the model economy from the simulated
micro data?
The wage rate in annual survey data is measured as ln(w) = ln
AnnualEarnings
AnnualHours . We now argue that (even
in the absence of measurement error in hours and earnings) this wage rate gives a noisy measure of the returns
to work faced by individuals which biases estimates of the empirical elasticity of labor obtained with annual
data. We run a regression (A-1) with annual model data assuming away measurement error and using the
55quarterly sum of realized labor productivity as an explanatory variable (ln
P
z instead of lnw). In order to
incorporate labor supply responses along the extensive margin we run regression (A-1) on changes in log-leisure
rather than changes in log hours (to avoid the log-zero problem when individuals do not work). Table A-2
shows that the annual elasticity of leisure increases from  0:37 to  0:52 when using the quarterly sum of
labor-productivity instead of annual wages. Next, we show that there are some other important subtleties
in aggregating the returns to work over the year. To this end, we run the regression (A-1) using
P
(ln(z))
as a regressor. While the empirical elasticity of leisure is  0:52 when using ln
P
z, it is  0:57 when using P
(ln(z)). Hence, the log of the sum of labor productivities (ln
P
z) is a worse measure of the returns to
work faced by individuals during the year than the sum of the log of quarterly labor productivities
P
(ln(z)).
Because there may be important wealth eects associated with change in labor productivity over the year,
we isolate the substitution eect of a change in labor productivity by instrumenting he regression (A-1) with
changes in lagged
P
(ln(z)). This procedure gives an empirical elasticity of leisure equal to  0:88, which fully
recovers the aggregate elasticity of leisure obtained in the temporary wage experiment.








 = 1:8 -0.56 -0.40 -0.53 -0.59 -1.06 -1.01
 = 2:0: Baseline -0.50 -0.37 -0.52 -0.57 -0.88 -0.85
 = 2:2 -0.45 -0.35 -0.50 -0.55 -0.76 -0.72
 = 2:0: Fixed cost -0.50 -0.27 -0.34 -0.39 -0.46 -0.43
56Table A-3: Transition Matrix across Annual Hours Cells, in Percent, PSID, 1968-1996, Men.
Ages 18-29
To Relative
From 000-100 100-1500 1500-2800 2800+ Size
0-100 50.11 32.20 16.52 1.17 6.42
100-1500 7.55 46.68 42.53 3.24 22.00
1500-2800 0.81 9.73 81.34 8.11 62.19
2800+ 0.32 4.15 48.78 46.75 9.39
Ages 30-54
To Relative
From 0-100 100-1500 1500-2800 2800+ Size
0-100 78.46 14.72 6.16 0.66 15.12
100-1500 10.56 37.78 47.20 4.46 8.01
1500-2800 0.60 5.48 86.02 7.90 72.86
2800+ 0.26 2.61 38.78 58.35 15.12
Ages 55-65
To Relative
From 0-100 100-1500 1500-2800 2800+ Size
0-100 92.18 6.40 1.23 0.19 21.19
100-1500 31.88 42.47 23.81 1.85 13.92
1500-2800 2.22 12.80 79.44 5.54 56.17
2800+ 1.37 4.61 40.52 53.51 8.72
Note: Authors' calculations from the PSID.




From 000-100 100-1500 1500-2800 2800+ Size
0-100 55.03 24.12 20.56 0.29 6.90
100-1500 11.10 31.66 54.92 2.33 12.50
1500-2800 1.05 7.04 87.26 4.64 74.12
2800+ 0.26 2.14 48.14 49.47 6.47
Ages 30-54
To Relative
From 0-100 100-1500 1500-2800 2800+ Size
0-100 81.37 9.85 8.43 0.36 6.26
100-1500 17.83 30.20 50.03 1.94 5.40
1500-2800 1.18 3.69 90.19 4.94 78.83
2800+ 0.24 2.07 42.72 54.97 9.51
Ages 55-65
To Relative
From 0-100 100-1500 1500-2800 2800+ Size
0-100 92.35 5.30 2.35 0.0 25.55
100-1500 42.23 31.75 25.42 0.60 9.88
1500-2800 4.26 9.33 83.72 2.68 59.94
2800+ 2.59 3.73 44.33 49.35 4.62
Note: Authors' calculations from the PSID.
58Table A-5: Transition Probability across Annual Hours Cells, PSID, 1968-1996, Men, College.
Ages 18-29
To Relative
From 000-100 100-1500 1500-2800 2800+ Size
0-100 48.75 29.99 20.14 1.13 5.65
100-1500 7.99 42.97 47.47 1.57 15.78
1500-2800 0.65 5.77 88.08 5.49 72.64
2800+ 0.38 2.07 54.50 43.05 5.93
Ages 30-54
To Relative
From 0-100 100-1500 1500-2800 2800+ Size
0-100 68.47 13.82 16.90 0.81 1.65
100-1500 8.31 31.72 55.52 4.44 3.27
1500-2800 0.44 2.28 91.42 5.86 84.55
2800+ 0.24 0.98 49.03 49.76 10.54
Ages 55-65
To Relative
From 0-100 100-1500 1500-2800 2800+ Size
0-100 93.69 4.48 1.83 0.0 14.13
100-1500 30.56 37.05 29.42 2.97 21.30
1500-2800 2.32 7.70 85.90 4.08 73.00
2800+ 0.0 2.94 62.06 35.0 5.70











































































































































































































































































































































































































































60Figure A-1: Mean Annual Hours Worked, Workers with Positive Hours, 1968-1996, PSID
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Figure A-2: Participation Rate, Fraction of Workers with Positive Annual Hours, 1968-1996,
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SIPP: 1990 panel, High−school and College, 25−62 Years Old
Graphs by ind_educ and ind_age
®
Notes: The graphs show the distribution of hours in a 4-month period for age and
education groups. Group ij represents a particular age (i) and education (j) group.
i: 1. 26-40, 2. 41-55, 3. 56-61; j: 1. non-college, 2. college.
Figure A-4: The Fraction of Individuals Working Three Quadrimesters in a Year, by Educa-
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62Figure A-5: Variance of the Transitory Component of Residual Log Wages, Net of the Eect
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